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Introduction 
The 1980s and the 1990s has witnessed dramatic changes in the financial marketplace. Firstly, the 
availability of financial information for individual investors has increased dramatically. At the same time, 
there has been a substantial decline in the transaction costs for making investment decisions. These 
developments have multiplied investors’ options, so that in the process, they have been able to bypass the 
traditional intermediation process. Although the role of banks in countries such as U.S., U.K. etc., has 
been on the decline, banks nonetheless continue to play an important role in Germany, Italy etc. In India, 
banks still enjoy a predominant role in the intermediation process (Ajit and Bangar, 1997). At the same 
time, bank failures have become increasingly recurrent in the 1990s. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) estimates that around 130 countries are facing banking problems of various intensities. With rapid 
cross-border international capital flows, there are serious risks of systemic crisis and contagion arising 
from a run on a currency and/or a run on a bank. Growing internationalisation of banking in a country 
otherwise affected by endemic problems associated with largely state-owned banking, has necessitated 
regulatory authorities to undertake speedy reforms of the banking sector. The conventional remedies in 
the form of recapitalisation, prudential norms, lender-of-last-resort facility, have been employed and 
there are yielding slow but significant gains. These remedies nevertheless have imposed severe 
constraints on the monetary authorities and the Government. For instance, the fiscal burden borne by the 
Government towards recapitalisation of public sector banks (PSBs) for the period 1993-94 to 1996-97 
totalled Rs.16,384.3 crore. 
A solution advocated has been the establishment of ‘narrow banks’. In India, this concept has 
gained wider currency especially after the publication of the Report of the Committee on Capital Account 
Convertibility (CAC) (RBI, 1997). The Report of the Committee on the Financial System (Chairman: Shri 
M.Narasimham) had advocated the establishment of Asset Reconstruction Fund (ARF) to help strengthen 
the weak banks. Subsequently, large budgetary provisions were made to strengthen the capital base of 
such banks, though the ARF itself was not set up. The CAC Report’s stress on narrow banking was one 
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alternative, which could in theory obviate the need to make fiscal or monetary provisions for bailouts of 
weak banks. While the CAC Report does not explicitly explain the raison d’etre for its preferences for 
narrow banking in relation to alternatives such as ARF, strengthening deposit insurance or mergers or 
closures of weak banks, the issue has recently been examined afresh by the Committee on Banking Sector 
Reforms (Chairman: Shri M.Narasimham) and the Working Group on Harmonising the Role and 
Operations of DFIs and Banks (Chairman: Shri S.H.Khan) which have presented their reports. While the 
Committee on Banking Sector Reforms in its recommendations has reiterated the need to establish ARF, it 
has also strongly advocated synergetic mergers among banks. The Committee further notes that there 
could be some weak banks that are potentially viable and need corrective measures. In such cases, the 
Committee has suggested the possibility of taking recourse to the narrow banking route as a possible 
short-term solution to facilitate their rehabilitation. However, if the narrow banking option is found 
unviable, the Committee suggests the issue of closure could well be examined. The Khan Committee 
Report has also recommended mergers as a solution for addressing the weak banks’ problems and comes 
out with a cogent argument in favour of universal banking. An interpretation of the recommendations of 
the two Reports as the former advocating narrow banking and he later favouring universal banking, in 
preference of the other, would be an oversimplification. Yet, clearly, while the CAC Report sees narrow 
banking as the solution for the weak banks, the Narasimham Report sees narrow banking as one of the 
possible options to address the weak banks’ problems. The Khan Report does not directly address the 
appropriateness of narrow banking for strengthening weak banks, but favours promotion of universal 
banking.2 The appropriateness of narrow banking in the Indian context needs to be discussed in a 
threadbare manner. The objective of this paper is to explore this issue in-depth. 
 
2. Narrow Banks and Narrow Banking 
The term ‘narrow banks’, developed by Robert E. Litan of the Brookings Institution in 1987 
argues that banking sector reforms should strive to create institutional structures aimed at minimizing 
the potential risks to which financial systems are vulnerable.3 In other words, it envisages the functional 
separation of depository and lending activities of highly diversified (italics in original) firms (banks). These 
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banks – the ‘narrow banks’ would offer only demand deposit accounts and back these accounts entirely 
with marketable securities of minimal risk4. Activities outside the purview of the narrow bank would be 
funded by liabilities other than insured deposits. Due to the risk-free nature of the underlying assets, 
moral hazard and capital adequacy problems are likely to be minimal. They would only be needed to 
make reports of their assets and deposits, subject to a verification on occasion. Table 1 lists a few papers 
that deals with the issue.   
Table 1: Studies on Narrow Banking 
Author/Year Country/ Period Issue 
Wallace (1996) -- Theoretical model of narrow 
banking 
Fernandez and Schumacher (1996) Argentine banks  
 
Applicability of narrow banking 
in Argentina 
Spong (1996) US banks Narrow banking as an alternative 
to traditional banking 
Kobayakawa and Nakamura (2000) -- Survey of narrow banking 
proposals in US and Japan and 
their feasibility for financial 
system stability 
Bossone (2001) Estimates the cost of 
bank narrowness 
Impact of foreign bank entry on 
Turkish banks 
 
The idea is that an insured deposit is essentially a transactions account, not an investment vehicle 
for the depositor. The narrow bank could be embedded within a larger bank with unrestricted powers. 
Under narrow banking therefore, the return to the depositor would essentially be the return on the 
securities minus fees for servicing the accounts. To quote from Bruni (1995: 96):  
“Narrow banks …would take care of liquidity services, with no risk of bank runs and, virtually no need of 
capital or of deposit insurance.…..therefore the typical lending operations of banks would not produce any 
systemic risk and would not need any special regulation or supervision”. 
 
 In practice, narrow banking in a stricter sense has come to be associated with restriction on weak 
banks to accept only demand deposits and place all these incremental funds in Government securities. It 
is an offshoot of the ‘100 per cent reserve banking proposal’. In a somewhat broader sense, narrow 
banking amounts to defining a class of deposits which are backed fully by securities of high liquidity and 
safety so that banks are always in a position to meet any run on deposits. To make the concept 
operational, it has sometimes been suggested that narrow banks should be embedded in a parent 
company to be set up as a financial holding company (FHC). The FHC would be expected to lend 
financial support to the weak bank, but would have no claim on the dividends of the weak banks as its 
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subsidiary/affiliate. In a somewhat restrictive version of the proposal, earnings generated by depository 
subsidiary could be channelled back to the FHC parent and there from to ailing affiliates undertaking 
para-banking activities. It is apparent that banking proposals of these kinds aims at safeguarding 
depositors’ savings without any formal deposit insurance mechanism. The present chapter discusses the 
theory underlying narrow banking and examines its relevance in the Indian context.  
 
3. The Pros and Cons of Narrow Banking 
In a Diamond-Dybvig economy, depositors might resort to premature withdrawal of deposits in 
anticipation that the intermediary will run out of assets. Such runs on deposits result from asset-liability 
mismatches. Narrow banking might be a viable alternative in such a case. The highly marketable assets of 
these banks would provide ready and ample liquidity to meet unforeseen deposit withdrawals, 
preventing bank runs.  Secondly, for banks with high levels of non-performing assets (NPAs), narrow 
banking could be a viable proposition. Any incremental deposit can be diverted to riskless securities, 
foreclosing the build-up of any non-performing assets. Thirdly, with compliance regulation being 
restricted to a simple monitoring of the narrow bank’s asset portfolio, the need for extensive Government 
intervention in bank lending and related policy decisions would stand curtailed. Finally, narrow banking 
ensures stability of the financial system by allowing for the structural separation of the deposit 
acceptance and loan making activities.  
Critics have been quick to point out several drawbacks of narrow banking. The feasibility of 
narrow banking depends, to a large extent, on whether these banks can obtain adequate low-risk assets to 
back their deposits. The supply of riskless assets might not suffice to back the potential demand for such 
deposits. Furthermore, in a narrow banking world, if society were to value riskless assets highly, it would 
raise their price so much so that narrow banks might end up holding less secure paper (Caprio and 
Summers, 1996).  Second, rational expectation theorists (Wallace, 1996) have argued that the proposal of 
narrow banking does not offer any consistent model-based explanation. Such an omission might have 
serious repercussions because a coherent model-based explanation is likely to suggest the benefits 
accompanying the introduction of such systems. As Wallace observes “…experimentation on the actual 
economy may be very costly, particularly if narrow banking is not, in fact, a good idea” (pp. 3). Thirdly, 
narrow banking places an overriding emphasis on the stability of the financial system and ignores 
altogether the two other major functions of the financial system: lowering intermediation costs and 
promoting productive investment. These functions, narrow banking proponents assume, will be largely 
accomplished in a deregulated financial market. Concerns have been voiced that an integrated 
marketplace might often leave some credit needs unmet, especially for marginal participants in the credit 
market (Dymski, 1993). Moreover, given the interrelations among the various segments of the financial 
sector, it might be difficult to maintain stability of the financial system by controlling merely one category 
of financial institutions at the cost of ignoring others. Complex connections and contagion effects exist 
within the financial system so that an exclusive focus on one sector might prove counterproductive 
engender large systemic risks (Spong, 1996).  
The key to narrow banking lies in the answer to the question whether narrow banking in fact 
would reduce the risks in banking. Proposal to convert weak banks to narrow banks pre-supposes that 
narrow banking is the best way to reduce risks for weak banks. By locking all incremental assets in 
Government securities, so that the gilts match all demand liabilities of the bank, these banks, in effect, 
seek to minimise the possibilities of a liquidity mismatch to a degree that it can cope with any future run 
on the bank. Banks in face of liquidity mismatches are unable to obtain sufficient funds through new 
liabilities or by converting assets promptly at reasonable cost. The resultant asset-liability mismatch 
erodes bank’s profitability and can eventually trigger a run that may see the bank becoming insolvent in a 
relatively short span of time. Narrow banking also minimises the credit risks facing the banks as all their 
new investments are in gilts, and these sovereign guaranteed securities are the safest form of assets 
against possibility of defaults. 
But liquidity and credit risks are not the only type of risks facing banks. If weak banks were 
converted to narrow banks, they would expose such banks to heightened market risks. These banks 
would potentially face losses in on- and off-balance sheet positions arising from volatility in market 
prices of the securities. Most of the weak banks have displayed poor treasury management skills. Unless 
the proposal to convert weak banks to narrow banks is accompanied by a thorough revamping of their 
treasury operations, the narrow banks would perhaps saddle themselves with various market risks. 
These risks may even outstrip the reduction in credit and liquidity risks brought about by narrow 
banking. The interest rate exposures would, in due course, become so sizeable that any shifts in the 
slopes, kinks or intercept of the yield curve can shrink bank’s earning and capital base. Besides, given the 
archaic treasury management skills endowed in their organisational and incentive structures, locking of 
assets predominantly in gilts would make their balance sheet susceptible to repricing risk, basis risk and 
optionality.5 Also, the very announcement effect of narrow banking is a source of incipient reputational 
losses. These reputational losses can, in extreme cases, engender a shift in customer perception turning an 
otherwise viable bank into insolvent one amidst runs typical to financial markets characterised by 
multiple equilibria. 
Narrow banking proposal may appear to be an easy route for reforms of the weak banks, but a 
surer way may lie in a more comprehensive action covering all facets of banking activities. Liquidity 
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management would have to remain an integral, and perhaps even a central, part of the process. The goal 
of ensuring that the banks are able to meet all contractual commitments is not mutually exclusive from 
other goals of banking sector reforms. Also, narrow banking is not the only tool for sound liquidity 
management. Banks should no doubt maintain adequate levels of liquid assets. But, they should also seek 
a broader funding base as well as diversified portfolio of their asset holdings to minimise market-related 
risks. The financing patterns on the sources side and the investment pattern on the uses side should be 
supported by sound management information systems (MIS) and central liquidity control. Improvements 
in MIS comprising timely assessment of the character and degree of risk being assumed by the bank in 
the course of its operations, greater clarity and accountability to the roles of the Board of Directors and 
external auditors, transparent policies in areas like investment, loans, asset-liability management and 
recovery management needs to be put in place. These measures will help strengthen the perceived 
linkage between management and risk control. 
Enforcing exacting credit disbursal and monitoring standards can also turn around weak banks. 
Such contraction does not classify as a classical narrow banking proposal, albeit some may mix it up with 
a loosely defined narrow banking. A clear distinction between a proposal which seem to impose narrow 
banking constraint and a proposal which seek to bring down the non-performing loans of weak banks by 
stricter accounting norms or through monitoring standards appear necessary to critically assess the 
viability of narrow banking proposal. Banking reforms can aim at setting up guidelines for freeing credit 
decisions of extraneous pressures, which are not guided in sound commercial lines or economic viability. 
If gilts offer the best option for investment on these considerations, the weak as well as the narrow banks 
can benefit from them. If this is not the case, weak banks could better benefit from granting more 
collateral-based loans or in investing in other relatively safe financial assets. In either case, banks need to 
continually assess and appraise any kind of assets, whether they are primary assets reflected in the books 
or underlying assets which afford some kind of guarantee. Gilts are no exception to this rule, even while 
it is true that under certain circumstances, weak banks can benefit by correcting their asset-liability 
mismatch by increased coverage of their demand liabilities by safe and liquid investments.  
A cardinal principle of sound banking practice is avoiding concentration of risk and large 
exposures. Narrow banking proposal unduly increases the concentration in advances to Government. It is 
generally believed that the default risk attached to Government securities is zero. This view does not find 
unconditional acceptance in the literature. Dornbusch and Draghi (1990) have documented episodes of 
repudiation of public debt. In case of developing countries, the problem of bankruptcy or of defaults on 
domestic or international debt is not uncommon. Besides, if the narrow banking proposal cover 
investment in state Government securities, then the default risk needs to be evaluated even more 
carefully in the face of envisaged reforms of the debt markets. Public finances of some states in India are 
in a rather bad shape and unless these states are forced to issue mortgage-backed securities, their default 
risk could be even higher. In any case, it seems reasonable to assume that the default risk attached to 
Government securities is close to zero, though not zero.  An essential element in the consideration of 
banking risks is the recognition that far more important than the default risk is the risk of capital losses 
that banks can incur on their portfolio of Government securities. History is replete with cases when 
central banks or the Government has tried inflicting capital losses on holders of public debt, not just by 
inflating but also by manipulating the yields against a floating rate instrument or otherwise (Dornbusch 
and Draghi, 1990). Even considering that this has not been a designed practice in this country, one would 
still have to tread with caution. Auctions and secondary trading are zero-sum game in which the weak 
banks are more likely to end up on the losing side against the better-endowed banks. A large exposure to 
single borrower, viz., the Government, in this case does not appear to be a reasonable policy for banking 
reforms. In the event of the banks being permitted to invest in treasury bills and treasury bonds of foreign 
Governments as the economy progresses on the path of capital account convertibility, their exposures can 
be somewhat diversified. But, in such a regime, the banks would need to assess not only the credit ratings 
of sovereigns, but also take cognizance of the foreign exchange risk. 
New accounting practices have helped in better recording the non-performing loans (NPLs) of 
the banks. As a result, the credit risk is getting relatively clearer reflection in the balance sheets of banks. 
However, the stated NPLs do not give a clear picture of the risks the banks are trading in their trading 
book. Many of the banks still do not have a satisfactory practice of marking their securities portfolio to 
the market and very few of them have a comprehensive model for assessing value-at-risk. The evident 
risk in classical banking may, therefore, be overrated, while that of narrow banking, underrated. 
While there may still be cases where conversion of weak banks to narrow banks may be a 
preferred policy option, it is essential that this case be brought out clearly on a case-by-case basis. A 
detailed exercise is necessary for specific risk factors. The interest rate risk needs to be worked out by 
taking differential risk factors for a segmented yield curve and these risk factors would have to be a 
function of bank’s trading strategies, keeping in view the trading limits and other related instructions and 
rules which govern trading dealers. The spread risk between various kinds of fixed income securities 
including Government securities would have to be quantified. Exchange risk is increasingly becoming 
important and risk factors need to be worked out separately for currency of denomination and weighted 
by bank’s positions in these currencies before value-at-risk is stated in domestic currency. For equity price 
risks, it is essential to work out specific and general market risks separately. Furthermore, beta risks need 
to be derived relative to market index as well as on a sectoral basis. For banks having considerable 
exposures in commodities, the risk has to be commodity-specific with risks for derivative positions 
accounted separately. Only with such financial analysis would relative risks in banking come out clearly 
enough for a judgement over whether narrow banking could sufficiently reduce risks in banking. 
Finally, the narrow banking proposal has repercussions for the overall structure of the banking 
industry. While the entry of number of private banks, including foreign banks, in the last few years has 
increased competition, the industry is still not competitive enough by global standards. The large 
dominance of the State Bank of India (SBI) in all segments of banking has affected market play. This is 
reflected in the fact that amongst the public sector banks, SBI group (SBI and its seven associates) is the 
biggest unit with over 13,000 offices and deposits aggregating Rs.1,24,880 crore and advances amounting 
to Rs.83,914 crore at the end of March 1997. As such, the SBI group accounts for around 34 per cent of 
aggregate banking business (aggregate of deposits and advances) conducted by the public sector banks 
and around 27 per cent of the business for the entire banking system. Introduction of narrow banking 
proposal may perpetuate this position as fewer banks may be placed to render classical banking function. 
The conversion of weak banks to narrow banks could, therefore, accentuate antitrust problems for the 
Indian banking industry. 
 
4. Which Banks can be converted to Narrow Banks? 
Considering the diffused nature of the risks, narrow banking is clearly not a solution to reform 
weak banks. In any case, in the first place, one has to take a view on which banks can be considered for 
conversion into narrow banks. In other words, being ‘how weak’ is weak enough for imposing the speed 
limits ascribed to in the narrow banking proposal? There are scant guidelines in the literature to answer 
this question. Nevertheless, helpful inferences can be extracted from indicators for banking insolvencies 
and banking crises. 
While a number of indicators have been proposed in the literature covering both macroeconomic 
and microeconomic variables, the key to banking soundness is seen to lie in capital adequacy and low 
level of NPAs. This helps prevents isolated bank failures and timely action to strengthen banks on a case-
by-case basis can provide the best insurance against pervasive failures. Based on the capital status and the 
asset quality of banks, we propose a two-factor criteria for identifying banks, which are weak and 
prospective candidates for narrow banking (Table 2). 
Table 2: Indicators of Bank Soundness 
Capital Status Risk-Weighted Capital  Core Capital 
Well capitalised 0 per cent 5 per cent 
Absolutely capitalised 8 per cent 4 per cent 
Under capitalised Less than 8 per cent Less than 4 per cent 
Significantly under-capitalised Less than 6 per cent Less than 3 per cent 
Critically under-capitalised 4 per cent Less than 2 per cent 
 
In the context of banking crisis, Sheng (1992) has observed that banking systems with problem 
loans of 15 per cent or more have inevitably encountered a crisis. Although bad debts accumulate over a 
period of time, more often than not, they accumulate quickly over a short/medium time span (say, two or 
three years), and once they exceed the critical level of 10 per cent, the likelihood of bank failure escalates 
rapidly. Following Sheng (1992), we consider the NPA ratio of 15 per cent and above as ‘explosive’. The 
maturity of bank loans, on an average, may be considered to be seven years. In that case, the discount in 
the values of all assets marked to market like a seven-year bond implies that a 15 per cent decline in loan 
yield due to corresponding increase in non-performing loans would totally decapitalise a bank with 8 per 
cent. Also, if the banks were asked to make an average provision of 50 per cent against non-performing 
loans, the capital base of 8 per cent would get eroded by loan loss provisions if these non-performing 
loans exceed 15 per cent of total loans. The explosive nature of the 15 per cent threshold limit for non-
performing loans is also confirmed by an examination of cross-country evidence presented by Sheng 
(1992). Clearly, banks with NPAs exceeding 15 per cent are obvious candidates for narrow banking. 
Furthermore, Sheng (1992) observes that bad debts accumulate over a period of time. However, once they 
build up, they accumulate quickly over a short/medium time span (say, two or three years), and once 
they exceed the critical level of 10 per cent, the likelihood of bank failures escalates rapidly. As such, we 
consider NPAs in the range [10,15) per cent to be ‘high’, even though not explosive. Banks having NPAs 
in this range can also be considered as prospective candidates for narrow banking. As an early warning 
signal, the benchmark of NPAs of 7 per cent can be considered on ground of soundness. NPAs above this 
level may be worrisome, but need not necessarily graduate into danger zone. Therefore, the range of 
NPAs of [7, 10) per cent can be considered ‘fragile’ warranting remedial action, but these banks need not 
be subjected to narrow banking to ensure their liquidity and solvency. NPAs in the range of [5, 7) per cent 
may be viewed as ‘moderate’ and measures within the control of bank management should suffice as an 
action. Finally, NPAs below 5 per cent are quite ‘manageable’ are can be considered commensurate with 
sound banking. 
On the capital front, we consider the regulatory action under the 1991Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) and several documents of the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS), including the capital accord. One needs to recognise that the ratio of 8 per cent for the capital to risk 
asset ratio (CRAR) is recommended as a minimum, and there is a view that higher CRAR may be 
necessary in select cases and markets. Therefore, in our judgement, while banks with CRAR of 8 per cent 
may be considered as sufficiently capitalised, above with CRAR of 10 per cent or above may only be 
considered as absolutely capitalised. The FDICIA considered banks with CRAR of 10 per cent and core 
capital of 5 per cent and above as well-capitalised. The Act nevertheless makes it clear that even these 
banks cannot make any capital distribution or pay a management fee to a controlling person that would 
leave the institution undercapitalised. Therefore, we consider only those banks having CRAR of 12 per 
cent and above as ‘well capitalised’. If such banks also have a low level of NPAs, we can comfortably 
place them outside any regulatory action concerning capital status or asset quality. However, we do 
recognise the remote possibility of some banks getting overcapitalised and not making full use of 
leveraging possibilities. Yet, perhaps in the context of categorising weakness in banking structures, it may 
not be useful to separately classify them. Banks with CRAR in the range of  [10, 12) per cent can be 
considered as ‘absolutely capitalised’, but they could continue to be under watch to prevent any 
weakening of their capital base, even if no action is contemplated. On the other hand, banks with CRAR 
in the range of [8, 10) per cent qualify as being ‘sufficiently capitalised’, keeping in view the BIS norm and 
the fact that Government-owned banks in any case have an implicit sovereign guarantee of some kind. 
Yet, it would be advisable for the management of these banks to aim to further strengthen their capital 
base. Banks which do not meet the BIS capital adequacy criteria and have CRAR in the range [4, 8) per 
cent can be considered as ‘undercapitalised’. These banks need to be subjected to enhanced monitoring; a 
memorandum of understanding covering the asset liability management (ALM) and a Government 
approved plan for increasing the capital base. Banks with even lower CRAR may be classified as 
‘critically undercapitalised’. These banks should need immediate capital restoration plan and may be 
subjected to enhanced provisioning, some kind of restriction on asset growth and on interest rates offered 
on deposit. Also, a closer look at their accounting practices is necessary. We prefer not to make a 
distinction between critically undercapitalised banks and those which have their net worth completely 
eroded so as to have zero or negative CRAR. We view banks with CRAR of below 4 per cent as sure 
candidates for complete erosion of net worth at slight shocks, so that this deterioration can only be 
considered a matter of time. Banks that are critically undercapitalised are obvious choices for narrow 
banking. Banks that are undercapitalised may also be considered for narrow banking, especially if they 
have a high level of NPAs as well.  
Considering the two factors together, we earmark PSBs, which are either undercapitalised or 
have high NPAs as ‘weak’ and probable candidates for barrow banking. Of these, banks which are 
critically undercapitalised or have explosive NPAs are obvious choices. But even banks which are 
critically undercapitalised are saddled with high NPAs or have explosive NPAs are undercapitalised, can 
clearly be considered as candidates for narrow banking.  
 
5. The Indian Evidence 
The concept of narrow banks has been at the forefront of public policy discussion in India in 
recent times. The Report of the Committee on Capital Account Convertibility (Chairman: Shri S S 
Tarapore), popularly referred to as the CAC Report , has put forth the view that “… the weak banks 
should be converted into what are called ‘narrow banks’; the incremental resources of these banks should 
be restricted only to investments in Government securities…” (pp. 65) As part of overall consolidation of 
the financial sector, such measures, the Committee recognized “…are unavoidable if the financial system 
is to be safeguarded during the move towards CAC" (pp. 65).  
In the Indian context, the prescription of capital adequacy ratio of 8 per cent seems to follow a 
‘one size fits all’ formula. This way of judging bank riskiness might not be appropriate as it often fails to 
take into account the credit-worthiness of different groups of borrowers. It is therefore imperative that 
banks be classified according to their levels of capitalisation so as to ‘have a balanced portfolio between 
risk-free assets and risk assets’ (Rangarajan, 1997). Accordingly, one can envisage the following 
categorization of capital and non-performing assets (Table 3). 
Table 3: Classification of Banks according to CRAR and Asset Quality 
Capital Status CRAR (per cent) Asset Status NPA to total assets 
(per cent) 
Well Capitalised 0 Explosive NPA 15 and above 
Absolutely Capitalised 10 and above High NPA 10-15 
Sufficiently Capitalised 8-10 Critical NPA 7-10 
Under Capitalised 4-8 Moderate NPA 5-7 
Critically Undercapitalised Less than 4 Managable NPA Below 5 
 
In India, concerns have been expressed in certain quarters that, at least in the short-run, the 
promotion of narrow banking can distort the yield curve as narrow banks are compelled to bid non-
market prices to increase their Government securities holdings. Therefore, it is frequently asked if there 
are enough Government securities in the country to feed the concept of narrow banking. A careful 
analysis of the asset-liability position of the Indian banks, as available from their audited balance sheets, 
show that these fears are quite misplaced. Of the 27 PSBs, 10 banks have NPAs above 10 per cent and can 
be considered as well and prospective candidates for narrow banking (Table 4).  Their demand liabilities 
were placed at around Rs.14,000 crore at end-March 1997 or only 12 per cent of their aggregate deposit 
liabilities (Table5 (A)).6 Maturity pattern of the deposit liabilities exhibited no clear relationship with the 
strength of these banks, but on average, weak banks had a lower proportion of their liabilities callable at 
demand. Demand deposits accounted for about 12 per cent of aggregate deposit liabilities in case of the 
10 weak banks in comparison with 18 other PSBs at the end of March 1996 as well as March 1997 [Table 4 
and 5 (A to C)].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 The demand liabilities of the weak banks were higher at Rs.18,000 crore or 13 per cent of their aggregate deposit liabilities during 
1997‐98. 
    Table 4: Matrix of Banking Fragility based on Capital Adequacy and Non-performing Assets 
Variable High NPAs Low NPAs 
Low CRAR Indian Bank (-18.71, 25.91) 
UCO Bank (3.16, 13.96) 
 
0 
High CRAR United Bank of India (8.20, 19.08) 
Allahabad Bank (10.57, 14.84) 
Central Bank of India (9.41, 14.40) 
Punjab and Sind Bank (9.22, 12.04) 
State Bank of Hyderabad (10.84, 11.42) 
State Bank of Indore (9.31, 11.29) 
State Bank of Mysore (10.80, 10.96) 
Punjab National Bank (9.15, 10.38) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank of Maharashtra (9.07, 9.66) 
Vijaya Bank (11.50, 9.60) 
Dena Bank (10.81, 9.38) 
Canara Bank (10.17, 9.32) 
Bank of Baroda (11.80, 8.94) 
State Bank of Travancore (8.17, 8.84) 
State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur (8.82, 7.96) 
Indian Overseas Bank (10.07, 7.64) 
Syndicate Bank (8.80, 7.53) 
State Bank of India (12.17, 7.30) 
Union Bank of India (10.53, 6.98) 
Bank of India (10.20, 6.51) 
State Bank of Saurashtra (12.14, 6.50) 
State Bank of Patiala (11.25, 5.88) 
Oriental Bank of Commerce (17.50, 5.70) 
Andhra Bank (12.05, 4.10) 
Corporation Bank (11.27, 3.63) 
 
Figures in brackets are (CRAR, NPA) ratios in that order 
High NPAs are defined as NPAs of 10 per cent or above 
Low CRAR is defined as CRAR of less than 8 per cent 
Figures in the bottom RHS of each quadrant indicates the number of banks falling in that quadrant. 
Table 5 (A): Balance Sheet Ratio of Public Sector Banks (end-March 1993) 
Bank GoI Sec 
less DD 
liabilities 
(Rs. crore) 
DD 
liabilities/ 
Aggregate 
liabilities 
DD liabilities covered by 
 
DD and TD 
liabilities 
covered by 
Liquid Invt 
Interest 
Income/ 
Total 
Income 
Interest on 
Deposit/ 
Interest 
Expn 
Interest 
Expn/ Total 
Expn 
   GoI Sec Approv 
Sec 
Liquid 
Invt 
    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Indian Bk 2046 5.69 395.50 555.15 588.10 35.53 91.28 66.08 75.66 
United Bk of India 1410 0.25 300.70 371.54 411.40 47.02 93.64 81.69 61.49 
(A) Total: 
Explosive NPAs 
3456 7.33 347.71 362.63 499.15 39.56 91.96 71.06 70.48 
Allahabad Bk 416 2.91 136.53 264.19 271.74 40.35 89.55 84.68 69.92 
Central Bk of India 927 14.93 138.22 213.98 221.06 38.84 91.42 87.32 60.03 
UCO Bk 1109 11.22 188.79 258.53 275.91 34.59 87.04 87.81 58.22 
Punjab & Sind Bk 435 8.50 238.22 233.16 457.16 42.43 90.77 89.09 54.17 
State Bk of 
Hyderabad 
384 19.72 140.56 189.97 177.41 43.61 86.40 94.01 59.22 
State Bk of Indore 170 15.84 160.87 208.87 253.21 47.69 87.15 85.97 63.21 
State Bk of Mysore 287 12.87 186.43 248.50 281.19 41.55 83.65 92.43 62.19 
Punjab National Bk 646 14.22 121.41 240.63 228.93 38.09 92.68 88.79 67.63 
(B) Total: High 
NPAs 
4376 13.79 145.00 239.61 242.83 38.87 90.00 88.11 62.68 
Total : Narrow 
Banks (A+B) 
7832 12.42 170.56 267.65 275.04 39.06 90.46 83.80 64.48 
Bk of Maharashtra 677 11.45 235.36 325.01 343.46 44.40 91.28 91.38 53.69 
Vijaya Bk 589 12.91 220.19 258.53 278.29 41.21 85.25 85.29 53.85 
Dena Bk 752 12.50 227.11 282.60 294.37 42.01 91.04 94.69 58.04 
Canara Bk 116 15.48 103.89 258.26 178.89 32.76 88.68 81.74 59.99 
Bk of Baroda 920 12.80 129.93 199.47 213.39 31.39 91.54 88.29 66.25 
State Bk of 
Travancore 
491 8.02 275.34 401.23 401.91 35.11 88.67 91.77 65.60 
State Bk of Bikaner 173 14.16 135.84 219.56 221.95 36.66 86.28 93.04 62.01 
& Jaipur 
Indian Overseas Bk 1281 10.02 221.17 289.11 314.97 35.02 83.02 79.82 44.55 
Syndicate Bk 1177 10.65 211.47 283.36 283.56 33.89 89.89 94.23 42.82 
State Bk of India  1997 20.68 111.65 163.86 157.64 31.12 86.92 81.40 61.47 
New Bk of India 470 10.01 279.08 389.57 415.11 46.22 91.56 94.00 59.22 
(C) Total: Fragile 
NPAs 
8173 16.63 129.45 197.79 188.84 37.78 87.90 84.38 58.73 
Union Bk of India 1096 13.29 176.89 247.01 257.53 39.56 90.14 96.84 67.60 
Bk of India 1189 12.97 140.93 191.52 208.96 31.12 90.02 89.65 62.85 
State Bk of 
Saurashtra 
177 14.62 160.62 210.40 204.11 34.96 75.19 83.03 60.79 
State Bk of Patiala 94 15.41 115.14 192.65 197.98 36.11 92.66 92.35 59.86 
Oriental Bk of 
Commerce  
584 11.62 203.83 277.53 295.36 38.87 92.29 94.79 69.97 
(D) Total: Moderate 
NPAs 
3140 13.20 154.04 214.52 227.87 34.65 90.30 91.80 64.24 
Andhra Bk 501 9.79 210.11 329.78 355.06 38.50 90.53 94.97 58.89 
Corporation Bk 135 19.16 80.17 159.91 243.96 34.12 87.65 91.37 61.91 
(E) Total: 
Manageable NPAs 
366 13.84 132.43 228.22 228.89 36.77 89.23 93.65 59.96 
Total of 28 PSBs 16435 14.85 142.53 217.54 215.61 37.63 81.83 85.42 61.07 
SBI & Subsidiaries 
(8) 
1776 14.65 154.82 222.50 227.07 39.05 87.43 91.24 61.69 
Nationalised Bks 
(20) 
14659 12.47 157.88 253.56 253.33 36.12 90.14 86.35 60.88 
Figures in per cent unless indicated otherwise. 
 
 
Table 5 (B): Balance Sheet Ratio of Public Sector Banks (end-March 1996) 
Bank GoI Sec 
less DD 
liabilities 
(Rs. crore) 
DD 
liabilities/ 
Aggregate 
liabilities 
DD liabilities covered by 
 
DD and TD 
liabilities 
covered by 
Liquid Invt 
Interest 
Income/ 
Total 
Income 
Interest on 
Deposit/ 
Interest 
Expn 
Interest 
Expn/ Total 
Expn 
   GoI Sec Approv 
Sec 
Liquid 
Invt 
    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Indian Bk 2208 11.01 250.53 337.25 340.28 37.48 88.70 61.06 46.54 
United Bk of India 2511 11.74 343.33 431.75 421.10 49.44 89.45 95.84 55.56 
Allahabad Bk 1387 11.16 222.44 376.97 356.23 39.77 88.01 91.89 61.59 
(A) Total: 
Explosive NPAs 
4716  11.30 288.86 376.28 373.67 42.24 88.66 77.38 51.90 
Central Bk of India 2972 13.70 209.86 293.87 286.01 39.18 98.76 92.44 57.00 
Punjab National Bk 4422 11.49 241.90 383.06 350.80 40.30 89.51 91.91 58.37 
Vijaya Bk 1121 17.20 208.79 274.61 238.23 40.99 91.20 85.76 49.36 
UCO Bk 2380 14.87 239.83 313.96 304.76 45.33 89.27 89.36 54.76 
Punjab & Sind Bk 1120 9.01 311.55 465.16 448.49 40.39 89.88 88.36 57.93 
(B) Total: High 
NPAs 
12015 12.94 232.27 336.03 315.80 40.87 92.03 90.75 56.43 
Total : Narrow 
Banks (A+B) 
16731 12.55 244.48 344.71 328.28 41.20 90.97 86.14 54.79 
State Bk of 
Hyderabad 
397 20.36 132.03 173.74 160.68 32.72 84.72 93.26 55.92 
State Bk of Indore 247 9.34 151.78 191.66 192.22 37.18 86.56 89.23 53.54 
Bk of Maharashtra 1410 13.66 272.88 388.23 346.69 47.36 90.57 90.23 57.29 
State Bk of Mysore 508 14.55 191.86 250.99 246.80 35.90 84.74 92.43 55.23 
Indian Overseas Bk 2513 13.98 223.22 298.24 277.64 38.81 92.10 73.38 70.12 
Syndicate Bk 2751 13.88 261.59 357.93 311.97 41.75 90.57 95.16 58.42 
Bk of Baroda 2741 13.15 173.47 257.94 244.42 32.14 87.99 91.30 59.39 
Canara Bk 800 18.20 116.73 224.22 169.13 30.77 86.18 84.66 59.98 
State Bk of 
Travancore 
894 9.77 268.61 354.52 370.14 36.18 86.78 89.37 63.84 
Dena Bk 1118 13.68 226.24 312.07 286.65 39.20 89.27 88.61 59.93 
Bk of India  2907 15.17 169.65 229.58 213.88 32.44 87.29 92.68 63.88 
(C) Total: Fragile 
NPAs 
13377 14.93 179.87 267.31 237.45 35.46 87.95 88.47 60.97 
State Bk of India 8120 23.32 136.12 194.95 174.32 40.65 82.46 80.30 55.27 
State Bk of Patiala 423 17.89 137.99 195.36 193.88 34.68 88.00 95.10 58.42 
State Bk of Bikaner 
& Jaipur 
478 17.46 158.79 230.16 225.47 39.36 84.95 91.60 54.31 
Union Bk of India 1806 14.35 170.35 253.98 223.73 32.10 91.34 96.59 61.53 
State Bk of 
Saurashtra 
635 18.20 211.03 250.15 282.23 51.37 82.74 90.70 34.36 
(D) Total: Moderate 
NPAs 
11461 21.47 141.62 202.66 183.47 39.38 83.76 83.59 55.28 
Oriental Bk of 
Commerce  
1357 11.86 231.42 346.94 292.71 34.71 91.05 94.31 65.52 
Andhra Bk 1193 11.64 271.70 337.47 367.15 42.73 98.89 90.27 61.84 
Corporation Bk 192 20.78 116.11 178.61 155.51 32.31 85.85 92.85 60.73 
(E) Total: 
Manageable NPAs 
2550 11.77 247.61 359.21 322.64 37.97 91.55 92.67 63.01 
Total of 27 PSBs 44121 16.58 176.60 254.72 232.46 38.54 87.26 86.38 57.32 
SBI & Subsidiaries 
(8) 
8895 13.44 195.22 284.39 260.96 35.07 89.13 92.97 59.20 
Nationalised Bks 
(19) 
33384 17.45 170.48 247.79 225.74 39.40 86.76 83.89 56.14 
Figures in per cent unless indicated otherwise. 
 
Table 5 (C): Balance Sheet Ratio of Public Sector Banks (end-March 1997) 
Bank GoI Sec 
less DD 
liabilities 
(Rs. crore) 
DD 
liabilities/ 
Aggregate 
liabilities 
DD liabilities covered by 
 
DD and TD 
liabilities 
covered by 
Liquid Invt 
Interest 
Income/ 
Total 
Income 
Interest on 
Deposit/ 
Interest 
Expn 
Interest 
Expn/ Total 
Expn 
   GoI Sec Approv 
Sec 
Liquid 
Invt 
    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Indian Bk 2534 11.00 260.82 340.04 328.71 36.14 87.81 72.97 66.47 
United Bk of India 3688 10.06 454.23 589.00 530.26 53.36 91.19 98.56 65.74 
(A) Total: 
Explosive NPAs 
6222 10.60 337.77 439.09 408.89 43.36 89.10 82.10 66.21 
Allahabad Bk 1962 10.33 264.61 441.90 390.84 40.37 87.60 97.15 62.85 
Central Bk of India 6121 13.54 296.08 379.79 360.12 48.77 89.25 98.56 63.14 
UCO Bk 3029 13.96 271.94 367.00 336.47 46.99 91.11 97.32 61.43 
Punjab $ Sind Bk 1398 9.94 320.44 474.98 436.38 43.38 88.88 95.39 66.51 
State Bk of 
Hyderabad 
870 20.03 160.00 202.15 181.58 36.38 86.73 94.55 57.89 
State Bk of Indore 297 21.67 149.04 180.29 183.36 39.72 87.79 95.74 55.42 
State Bk of Mysore 571 16.87 177.48 241.57 220.51 37.20 87.30 97.36 57.18 
Punjab National Bk 5704 10.62 274.41 427.35 373.91 39.69 88.63 96.06 62.77 
(B) Total: High 
NPAs 
19952 12.93 256.21 363.13 330.34 42.71 88.68 97.81 60.26 
Total : Narrow 
Banks (A+B) 
26174 12.46 270.08 376.04 343.69 42.84 88.76 94.43 64.73 
Bk of Maharashtra 1675 14.11 261.18 358.94 322.09 45.43 91.47 95.06 60.16 
Vijaya Bk 1080 19.62 180.64 321.36 207.16 40.65 92.05 96.08 64.18 
Dena Bk 1383 14.25 223.53 332.09 284.31 40.50 99.01 90.43 60.86 
Canara Bk 1154 18.20 120.16 214.62 162.26 29.53 88.24 94.32 61.21 
Bk of Baroda 2909 1.03 169.43 260.81 226.30 29.48 89.13 93.04 64.70 
State Bk of 
Travancore 
1401 11.32 291.40 358.77 342.73 38.81 87.98 91.37 66.62 
State Bk of Bikaner 
& Jaipur 
749 16.48 184.17 256.52 243.11 40.06 85.17 93.66 56.51 
Indian Overseas Bk 2743 14.64 217.28 281.84 267.23 39.14 90.66 86.41 73.57 
Syndicate Bk 3117 14.56 243.25 342.51 280.09 40.78 91.07 97.50 61.80 
State Bk of India  8413 23.17 132.80 182.59 165.47 38.34 84.98 86.54 58.97 
(C) Total: Fragile 
NPAs 
24624 18.90 154.49 220.25 193.67 36.60 87.37 75.21 64.31 
Union Bk of India 2230 15.58 171.54 248.85 216.42 33.73 92.05 98.63 67.34 
Bk of India 2487 16.84 146.19 198.18 184.18 31.02 87.76 93.99 65.14 
State Bk of 
Saurashtra 
485 19.05 168.86 219.22 215.10 40.99 85.85 94.52 62.21 
State Bk of Patiala 500 19.93 134.68 184.76 181.78 36.23 90.78 98.41 62.34 
Oriental Bk of 
Commerce  
1543 12.11 226.72 360.44 
 
279.60 33.86 92.30 97.61 65.67 
(D) Total: Moderate 
NPAs 
7245 16.26 161.06 227.76 203.99 33.17 89.76 96.27 63.66 
Andhra Bk 1362 13.26 244.83 355.04 312.97 41.51 88.89 95.93 62.75 
Corporation Bk 241 22.05 116.38 223.34 155.82 34.36 88.12 96.44 63.21 
(E) Total: 
Manageable NPAs 
1603 17.52 166.46 274.68 217.09 38.04 88.50 96.17 62.58 
Total of 27 PSBs 59647 16.66 179.68 355.22 226.90 37.80 88.13 94.61 69.20 
SBI & Subsidiaries 
(8) 
13287 21.78 141.25 191.72 175.78 38.28 85.59 88.64 59.28 
Nationalised Bks 
(19) 
46360 14.15 208.69 303.16 265.50 37.57 89.69 93.81 64.35 
Figures in per cent unless indicated otherwise. 
 
 
 If the presumption behind narrow banking is that in any event of a run on the banks, the demand 
liabilities should be fully covered by safe and liquid assets in the form of gilts, then the weak bank’s 
investments in Government securities should aggregate around Rs.15,400 crore. This is hardly a problem 
considering that their investments in these instruments were nearly 270 per cent of this requirement (!). 
Inclusive of other liquid assets, such as cash in hand, balances with other banks in current account and 
investment in other approved securities, total liquid investments of the weak banks aggregated Rs.50,000 
crore. Therefore, liquid investments not only back demand liabilities fully, but at 43 per cent of aggregate 
deposit liabilities, they also provide a reasonable coverage for the time liabilities of these banks. In a 
broad sense, narrow banking is already in practice on the asset side of the balance sheet and it does not 
afford any solution for reforming the weak banks in India. 
However, narrow banking may still be instrumental in improving the financial health of the 
weak banks if it enables banks to cut their interest costs. The expenditure structure of the weak banks is 
not significantly different from those of the other banks. Despite a lower proportion of liquid deposit 
liabilities, their interest outgo on deposits, as a ratio of total expenses is similar to those of the other 
banks. Bank-wise analysis for 1996-97 shows that five PSBs had incremental demand-total deposit 
liabilities ratio of 30 per cent or more7. Over the longer period 1993-97, six banks had incremental 
demand-total deposit liabilities in excess of 20 per cent8. The interest cost on deposits for these banks as a 
proportion of their total expenses was not significantly different from those whose incremental demand 
liabilities to total deposit liabilities were in the range of 10-20 per cent. For most banks, interest/deposit 
ratio hovered around 7 per cent during this period. This ratio had no clear relationship with either the 
NPAs or the demand/time deposit ratios, except for the fact that the interest cost ratio was markedly 
                                                          
7 Vijaya Bank, Corporation Bank, State Bank of Indore, State Bank of Mysore and State Bank of Patiala. 
8 Indian Bank, State Bank of Indore, Vijaya Bank, State Bank of Patiala, Corporation Bank and State Bank of Saurashtra. 
higher for five banks, which had most of their incremental deposits coming in the form of term deposits9. 
Moreover, increased reliance on term deposits also seem to have put some pressure on operating costs of 
these banks and these increased at a much faster pace than the banks which were able to attract demand 
deposits along with term deposits. Thus, there is weak evidence that interest outgo could be lowered by 
attracting more of demand liabilities.  
Notwithstanding the weak evidence above, in the extreme case of asset-liability management that 
the narrow banking represents, the lowering of interest costs may almost be taken as a truism arising 
from the theoretical construct. However, in practice, two problems arise. Firstly, the term structure of 
deposit liability is not entirely a control variable in the hands of bank management. While in a regime of 
deregulated interest rates, banks are in a much better position to decide their deposit-mix, weak banks 
may find it almost impossible to expand their liabilities exclusively through demand deposits, even if a 
policy decision was taken to this effect. Given the structure of ownership of bank deposits in India, there 
aren’t enough demand deposits available to the banks to do business at the short-end spectrum of 
liabilities as its base. Survey of ownership of bank deposits based on the Basic Statistical Returns (BSR-4) 
and Form X data for end-March 1995 reveals that of the total deposit liabilities of SCBs, only 13 per cent 
are in form of current deposits; term deposits account for 66 per cent of these liabilities, while savings 
deposits, which too have a pre-dominant time deposit component, account for the remaining 21 per cent. 
Net of inter-bank liabilities, the households own about 80 per cent of bank deposits; the private corporate 
sector and the non-bank financial institutions account for around 5 per cent, while the Government sector 
account for the remaining 10 per cent. Clearly, the demand deposit base is quite narrow in relation to the 
size of the banking activity. The size of the organized sector in the form of private corporate business and 
the Government sector is rather limited and this reduces the demand deposit base. Imposition of narrow 
banking constraint under these circumstances can restrict the growth in bank business for these banks. 
The squeeze could help in avoiding build-up of any new NPAs on the loan portfolio, but can continue to 
cause erosion in their balance sheets, both on liability and asset sides. Given the already existing NPA 
problems, instead of allowing weak banks to gain financial strength, shrinking balance sheets can result 
in weak banks becoming unviable in a shorter time span than otherwise. Secondly, while narrow banking 
may lower interest expense, it may lower interest income as well. Whether narrow banking would 
increase or decrease net income of the bank is an indeterminate issue in theory. A lot depends on the 
returns on financial assets. Since narrow banking restricts banks’ investments in Government securities, 
which, on average, can be considered low-risk, low-return instruments, odds are that weak banks may 
lower its interest income considerably. The effect on net income of the bank, even after adjusting for gains 
arising from lowering of NPAs, may well be negative for the narrow banks. The gains on NPAs on loan 
                                                          
9 Bank of Baroda, United Bank of India, Central Bank of India, Punjab National Bank and Allahabad Bank. 
portfolios could be undone by a single interest rate shock and even the seemingly risk-free Government 
paper could turn out to be of poor quality. As debt markets develop further and new instruments 
including interest rate derivatives are introduced in the market, these risks could be compounded further, 
unless these banks display treasury skills to successfully these risks. 
Commercial and co-operative banks accounted for only a quarter of the investments in central 
Government securities in 1992-93. Their share jumped to three-quarters in the following year and has 
stayed around two-thirds thereafter (RBI, 1996). The Monetary and Credit policy announcements in 
recent years, with its focus on a softer interest rate stance, have sparked off a virtual rate war across the 
entire spectrum of the banking industry. The attempt to kick-start real activity in the manufacturing 
sector encountered some difficulties as a result of currency pressures arising from large-scale 
devaluations of East Asian currencies. Measures taken in January 1998 to stem unwarranted speculative 
activity in the forex markets reversed the downward pressures on interest rates. On one hand, this 
indicates that banks will have to cope with increased interest rate risks as domestic markets become 
increasingly integrated with global ones. On the other hand, in the short-run, rising interest rates may 
exacerbate the slowdown in credit demand. Also, in view of the relaxation in external borrowing 
guidelines, better-rated corporates have been substituting domestic, costlier bank borrowings with 
relatively cheap overseas funds, leaving domestic banks with a surfeit of liquidity. Given the limited 
outlets for productive deployment of funds by banks, they have been resorting to parking their funds in 
Government securities. With interest income comprising over 80 per cent of income of PSBs, lower 
interest rate regime has implied pressures on bank spreads (Table 24.5). Such low spreads coupled with 
limited outlets for investment opportunities have impacted bank profitability.  
Secondly, the Monetary and Credit Policy announcements in October 1997 wherein the Bank Rate 
was reduced by 100 basis points has sparked off a virtual rate war across the entire spectrum of the 
banking industry. With an across-the-board deceleration in industrial growth in 1996-97 and the first half 
of 1997-98, whether credit off take will improve or not remains a moot question. Given the recent 
relaxations in external borrowing guidelines, better-rated corporates have been substituting domestic, 
costlier bank borrowings with relatively cheap overseas funds.  
Notwithstanding the recent reforms of the financial sector, signs of inefficiency in certain areas 
are evident viz., a well-defined short-term yield curve is missing, and, the money market is volatile: T-
bills and Government dated securities do not enjoy secondary liquidity. This leads to risk management 
problems for investors and inhibits further development of a primary market in Government debt. Thus, 
even if banks hold on to Government securities, it might encounter problems of illiquidity in the event of 
a run on its deposits.  
 
 
6. Can Narrow Banking Substitute Deposit Insurance? 
Deposit insurance found its rationale in the seminal contribution of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). 
However, there has been a greater recognition of the moral hazard problem of deposit insurance in recent 
times. It has been suggested that banking failures make bailouts a political necessity, which even 
reasonably independent central banks may find difficult to avoid. Any bailout can only be undertaken at 
the taxpayers’ cost as bailout invites transfer of resources from poorly organised taxpayers to better 
lobbying depositors10. While deposit insurance, in itself, reduces pressure for other forms of bailouts, it 
also creates moral hazard in weaker prudence attached to lending activities of the bank. Adverse 
selection effects in the form of more risky investment behaviour compound the problem. Narrow banking 
proposal has sometimes been advocated on the ground that it would limit the compulsions for deposit 
protection. Since narrow banking is based on defining a class of deposits which are backed by assets that 
are sufficiently liquid and safe to cover any bank run, deposit insurance no longer remains necessary to 
meet the bunching of deposit withdrawals.  
It seems likely that absence of deposit insurance will increase pressures for better disclosure 
norms, enforce tighter supervision and regulation and eventually compel the bank management to adopt 
more sound banking practices. Yet, it is not clear whether this in itself can preclude banking failures. 
Banking failures are more likely to arise in absence of deposit insurance. Notwithstanding the moral 
hazard argument, limited deposit insurance may still be the best way to avoid bank runs as it can avoid a 
shift to a bad equilibrium b shifting some of the incentive of monitoring to shareholders (i.e., making the 
system ‘incentive-compatible’). Narrow banking can obviate deposit insurance need to the degree it can 
be seen as a credible alternative to avoiding the need for bailouts to arise in the first place. But, if narrow 
banking scheme limits the size of the banking business of these weak banks to a degree that it calls into 
question the viability of the intermediation process, it can hasten the shift to a bad equilibrium. This can 
put increased pressure for interventions and bailouts by the authorities. Substitution of deposit insurance 
by narrow banking, which tends to lack credibility, would raise the return on deposits, which the narrow 
banks have to offer to compensate for the expected risk to their deposit in a deregulated environment. 
This could dampen the gains of reduced interest outgo that narrow banking affords. As such, narrow 
banking proposals might turn out to be more costly and more distortionary than deposit insurance. It 
would be more costly as the bailout size and the probability of occurrence of such an event would be 
larger in the absence of deposit insurance. It will also be more distortionary as costs of deposit insurance, 
at least in part, will be borne by the failed institution.  
                                                          
10 Tax‐payers may have to pay costs directly in the form of increased mobilisation of tax revenues or no‐tax revenues (e.g., hike in 
administered prices)  if the rescue package  involves strengthening of capital base or writing off of bad  loans; or they may have to 
pay these costs indirectly by seigniorage and capital asset losses if the central bank inflates to perform its lender‐of‐the‐last resort 
function. 
In this context, Honohan (1997) cautions that blanket deposit insurance coverage is best 
avoidable, especially if banks facing a run are strong enough to be bailed out by lender-of-the-last resort 
facility, which can be deployed to protect these banks at a lower cost. He describes the success of the 
blanket insurance in Turkey in stemming the depositor run in 1994 as effective, but only because the 
banking crisis was not accompanied by a currency crisis.  
 
7. Narrow versus Universal Banking 
Traditionally in India, short-term credit for working capital requirements were provided by 
banks, while financial institutions advanced long-term finance for industrial development. In recent 
times, there has been a gradual blurring of distinction between these two sorts of entities. On the demand 
side, with the drying up of concessional sources of finance, financial institutions have to perforce raise 
resources from the market at competitive rates. On the other hand, with each of them making a foray into 
the others’ traditional domain of operations, the competition for supply of funds has also intensified. This 
has compelled both types of entities to fine-tune their (interest) rate strategies with even provision for 
sub-PLR rates. Such moves represent the first step towards universal banking practices in the Indian 
financial system.11 
In economies affected by severe banking crises, it is only natural to ask whether it would serve 
the interest of financial stability to restrict the scope of banks’ activities and whether alternative 
institutions could provide the financial services that households and firms demand. As has been argued, 
the costs and benefits of alternative financial structures should take into account the fact that the main 
goal of financial sector is to have a system characterised by high performance and stability. In systems 
with weak regulatory and supervisory framework, restricting bank portfolios may lead to fewer bank 
failures, but not necessarily result in greater overall financial stability-the deficiencies in the regulatory 
framework may merely cause risks to be shifted from banks to non-banks. On the other hand, universal 
banks allowed to carry more risky assets may be subject to larger losses, but the diversification of their 
activities may lend them greater stability. However, universal banks are often closely interconnected with 
the rest of the financial system, so that the potential systemic effect of a bank failure could be greater than 
under narrow banking regime. 
The analysis of efficiency issues likewise produces inconclusive results. For example, universal 
banking may result in higher concentration in the banking industry and therefore, less competition, 
whereas narrow banking, although it might lead to less concentration, may prevent banks from realising 
the efficiency gains arising from scale and scope economies. Secondly, although narrow banking might 
keep banks out of certain financial activities, it might be susceptible to political manipulation. Since the 
                                                          
11 The essay was written in 1998. Subsequently, in 2001‐02, ICICI, a financial institution, converted itself into a bank by integrating 
itself with ICIC Bank Ltd. 
definition of ‘safe’ assets that narrow banks may hold is determined by the authorities, the temptation 
remains for policymakers to make ‘safe’ synonymous with ‘Government or Government-related’, which, 
in turn, increases the incentives of policymakers to finance fiscal deficits with Government paper held by 
banks.  
 
8. Do Country Experiences Reveal Anything? 
Narrow banking, till data, has remained more of a theoretical proposal. Inspite of widespread 
banking fragility in 1980s and 1990s, narrow banking has, at best, been implemented in a very weak form. 
Lindgren et al. (1996) note that since 1980, over 130 countries, comprising almost three-fourths of IMF’s 
member countries have experienced significant banking problems. Of these, 32 countries encountered 
banking crises with 38 such episodes. It is instructive to look at Lindgren et al.’s (1996) narrative and other 
available country studies to examine what these experiences reveal. Upon examination of the policy 
responses in these experiences, it is observed that narrow banking has not been tried as a policy action to 
stem the rot in the banking system anywhere. On the contrary, bank restructuring, merger, closure, 
nationalization, privatization and recapitalisation have been the preferred options. In several instances, 
the classical lender-of-the-last resort function by the central bank in infusing temporary liquidity has been 
attempted. Cases of temporary suspension of debt repayment as also deposit insurance routes have also 
found favour in certain cases. But, explicit restrictions on asset-liability structures of the banks have 
seldom been implemented. This indicates that narrow banking is not an easy solution in overcoming 
banking difficulties.  
Principles advocating some restrictions on asset liability structures have been tried in Sao Tome 
and Principe, where banking problems began in early 1980s, and became magnified by early 1990s with 
non-performing loans mounting to over 90 per cent in 1992. A new central bank and two commercial 
banks were created in 1993 and the new commercial banks took over many of the assets of the old banks, 
including some sticky portfolio. The new banks also ran into serious difficulties and the central bank 
responded by suspending the credit operations of one of these banks, though not restricting other 
activities. Given the state of the underdeveloped markets for fixed income securities in this country, the 
regulatory authorities’ intervention cannot be viewed as a typical narrow banking response. But even in 
this case, suspension of credit activity proved to be counterproductive in rescuing a bank. In another case, 
the central bank of Chad faced with non-performing loans of 35 per cent in the banking system, 
responded by consolidating these sticky loans of three main commercial banks, but stopped short of 
imposing severe restrictions on future lending or investment decisions of the bank. In both these cases, 
narrow banking was infeasible given the banking structure and the stage of development.  
In contrast to restrictions on classical banking functions, restructuring of the banking system has 
been a more popular alternative and often yielded better results. In Estonia in mid 1990s, two large but 
weak banks were merged and converted into a loan recovery agency. Two other banks were also merged 
and nationalized, even while licenses of five others were revoked. Lithuania also established a loan-
collecting agency in 1996. The Baltic country experiences with setting up of centralized loan collection 
agency have not been encouraging. Evidence indicates that a transfer of NPAs to a loan collecting agency, 
while drawing down their capital by equivalent amount, create an added incentive problem since there 
are little incentives to collect past dues than what is necessary to cover administrative costs. Such 
agencies, by creating a ‘bad loan bank’, signal admission of systemic problems in the banking sector. In 
the African state of Niger and Senegal, massive restructuring was undertaken in response to banking 
crises of mid 1980s. In Niger, four banks were liquidated and four others were restructured, whereas in 
Senegal, as many as eight banks were liquidated and the remaining ones were restructured. Liquidation 
also became necessary in Central African Republic where four banks had to be closed and in Equatorial 
Guinea where two of the largest banks went bust. In Benin and Guinea, the banking crises were so 
widespread that closures became an inevitable consequence. In Argentina, closures have been more 
frequent. In 1980-82, 168 financial intermediaries had to be closed as sticky loan mounted and were at a 
high of 35 per cent by mid 1980s. In 1989-90, the failures became more widespread and 40 per cent of the 
financial sector assets were lost. In 1995, in the aftermath of the Tequila crisis, 45 out of 205 institutions 
were closed or merged inspire of multilateral institutions providing bailout money. More recently, a spate 
of mergers has engulfed the banking industry. Notable among these include merger of Norway-based 
Nordbanken with Merita (cross-border merger with the largest Finnish bank), of Belgium-based Banque 
Bruxelles Lambert with ING Bank of Netherlands, the acquisition of 35 per cent stake in United Bulgaria by 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a 40 per cent holding in Laem Thong Bank (Thailand) by 
foreign interests and a 60 per cent majority holding in Bank of South-East Asia (Philippines) by Development 
Bank of Singapore. Several other mergers/acquisitions notably of Bank Indonesia International with Bank 
Dagan Negara Indonesia (in Indonesia), the Royal Bank of Canada with Bank of Montreal (Canada), a three-
way merger to create the second largest publicly-owned bank, Landesbanken Baden-Wurttemberg 
(Germany), Banco Santender with its subsidiary, Banesto (in Spain) have also taken place. Cross-country 
experiences reveal that in a large number of cases, banking closures have been the inevitable consequence 
of banking crises. In several other instances, closures and mergers have emerged as a practical response 
for turning over weak banks. 
Among other alternatives to stem the rot in the banking system, options such as nationalization, 
privatization and recapitalisation have also been attempted. During the Mexican debt crisis of 1982, 
Government effectively stepped in to take over the banking system. In Philippines, a number of financial 
institutions, including banks failed in the mid 1980s, had to be taken over by the Government. Even in 
Scandinavian economies like Norway, Government became the principal shareholder of the three largest 
banks accounting for 85 per cent of commercial banking assets as non-performing loans mounted to 6 per 
cent by end-1991. It has been pointed out that Norwegian banking problems were grounded in cyclical 
downturn in economic activities, weakening of capital ratios and inadequate loan loss provisions. In 
contrast, Congo faced with a banking crisis in 1994, privatized two state-owned banks, while liquidating 
two others. Recapitalisation was successfully tried in South Africa. In particular, one particular bank 
accounting for 15 per cent of banking assets was recapitalised after suffering loan losses and became 
solvent as a result. Temporary suspension of debt as a response to the banking panics was also attempted 
in South Africa in mid 1980s, where faced with large short-term liabilities, an official moratorium on 
external capital repayments by banks was effected by the Government.  
Classical lender-of-the-last resort (LOLR) functioning by central bank to bailout crumbling banks 
has also been implemented in recent times, most notably in Jordan, Venezuela and Bulgaria. In Jordan, 
runs followed the collapse of the third largest bank in 1989 and could be arrested by LOLR support from 
central bank. In Venezuela in 1994, the Government and the central bank joined the bailouts incurring 
resolution costs approximating 17 per cent of its GDP. In Bulgaria, the central bank let lose its reign on 
base money totally to quell runs on amidst 75 per cent non-Government loans becoming ‘past-due’. These 
bailouts are not a direct form of deposit insurance, but is, nevertheless, an indirect form of insurance 
without any insurance premium being paid. 
Deposit insurance as a means of tiding over banking crises have been less popular, and 
attempted mostly in the transition economies and that too, in the decade of the 1990s. In Mexico, banks 
were placed under the governance of the deposit insurance agency (FOBAPROA) after the crises. In 
Turkey, run on banks in 1994 led the Government to introduce full deposit insurance to stem the crisis. In 
the US, studies find that deposit insurance coverage is generally on the higher side, amounting to US 
$1,00,000; whereas elsewhere, deposit insurance offers very little coverage, as in Lebanon, where the 
coverage is only US $18. 
Despite its intuitive appeal, narrow banking has not been found practical in addressing the 
problems associated with bank soundness. The impracticality of narrow banking is more obvious in case 
of developing countries, where money and debt markets are largely underdeveloped and the deposit 
base if often skewed in favour of longer maturities.  
It is not easy to decipher any stylized facts from the cross-country experiences on banking 
difficulties. Mergers and acquisitions are financial decisions contingent upon the perceived value of the 
bank and can be decided on a case-by-case basis. But in general, restructuring has been a useful strategy 
to cope with banking difficulties. Changes in ownership either by nationalization or by way of 
privatization have not been very successful in addressing banking problems. Nationalisation often results 
in some crowding-out of private investment as directed credit to Government sector rises, encouraging 
these Governments to indulge in fiscal profligacy. In turn, when these banks are privatized at a later date, 
their skills in lending tend to become blunted. Mishkin (1994) provides evidence in favour of this in the 
context of Mexico, where bank lending to Government jumped to 50 per cent after nationalization in 1982 
and privatization in early 1990s led to excessively risky loans, resulting in adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems accompanying a virtual credit boom. The Mexican banking and financial crisis, which 
began in 1994, was rooted in this history. Recapitalisation has been an important element in providing 
strength to a fragile banking structure, but undeniably the fiscal burden it imposes makes the option less 
appealing. Bailouts through increased central bank accommodation, likewise, suffers from moral hazard. 
Diamond and Dybvig’s optimal deposit insurance contracts can be worked out and have been tried in 
some countries. In Turkey, it seems to have worked despite the seeming irrationality of providing 
complete insurance, but full deposit insurance can obviously not be endorsed as a policy tool. Narrow 
banking remains an unknown quantity, but experiences suggest that overtly restrictive asset-liability 
management regime could be counterproductive. Perhaps the best recourse is a mix of policies based on 
restructuring and improved management of assets, liabilities and attendant risks. 
The country experiences reveal very little on the prospects of narrow banking. Yet, the proposal 
for some kind of ‘speed limits’ on bank loan growth to limit banking problems has been advanced by 
Caprio et al. (1994). They ascribe the most common case of individual bank failures to rapid growth in 
loan portfolios. However, Honohan (1997) points out that limiting credit growth ex-ante may be difficult 
and induce avoidance. Besides, as observed earlier, other forms of banking risks cannot be ignored. There 
are enough episodes excessive market risks, not related to credit activities of the bank, have engendered 
banking failures.  
 
9. Policy Implications 
As the aforesaid discussion suggests, narrow banking has its benefits as well as pitfalls. On one 
hand, narrow banking would create a stable payment system by backing transactions deposits with risk-
free securities. This will help contain interest outgo and eliminate credit risk. The arrangement would 
pose little risk to depositors and would not require extensive Governmental support and intervention. On 
the flip side of the coin, narrow banking, with an overriding focus on stability, neglects other crucial 
functions of the financial system.  
In practice, the structure of the Indian economy and the history of bank regulation and 
institutional development make narrow banking a difficult proposition for India. First and foremost, the 
predominant share of financial surplus available for intermediation is sourced from households who 
maintain term deposits. This makes the demand deposit base extremely narrow to sustain weak banks 
through narrow banking. Second, although the Government securities market has become developed in 
recent times, narrow banking entails a risk of further crowding-out private investments. Third, narrow 
banking can affect directed credit to priority sectors even where recovery rates are reasonable and credit 
subsidization is not unduly large. Fourth, narrow banking exposes weak banks to heightened interest and 
other market-related risks. Unless treasury management skills of these banks improve, narrow banking 
could increase the overall risks in the banking system rather than reduce it. Fifth, in the context of Basel 
norms, narrow banking could be employed to circumvent capital requirements by use of tier-3 capital to 
support market risks. Sixth, unless the narrow banks are set up under the umbrella of stronger banks, 
they may perpetuate dominance of the dominant bank groups in the Indian banking industry by pre-
empting possibly synergetic mergers and consolidation in the industry. Seventh, narrow banking might 
deny the weak banks the benefit of ‘other income’. Finally, a narrow banking scheme, which lacks 
credibility, might turn out to be even more costly and more distortionary than a deposit insurance 
scheme. 
 
10. Concluding Observations 
Banking problems in India are rooted in the structure, but they are less extreme than in many 
other countries elsewhere. The levels of non-performing assets are high, but have witnessed a secular 
decline over time, testifying improved credit risk management skills by banks. International experiences 
with narrow banking is yet to throw up cases where the same has been successfully employed. Country 
experiences indicate a wide array of possibilities that may be considered for furthering banking sector 
reforms in India. While the practice of narrow banking in its strict sense appear to be infeasible on 
grounds of inadequate demand deposit base, alternatives such as securitisation of overdue loans, setting 
up asset reconstruction fund, mergers of weak banks, expanding LOLR options, incentive-compatible 
deposit insurance schemes might provide viable alternatives.  
In view of the above, narrow banking may be placed on hold till clearer cases emerge where such 
banking practices could help in reviving weak banks. Also, variants of the narrow banking proposal need 
to be identified to judge if they are viable, even if these forms do not fit into a strict traditional mode of 
narrow banking proposal. Some reduction in the scale of operations of a weak bank and consequent 
contraction in balance sheet might be an unavoidable outcome of any of the alternative designs for 
banking sector reform. The quality of incremental credit portfolio of the weak banks could be closely 
watched by the regulators, but continuation of classical banking activities of making commercial 
advances appear to be essential for survival of these banks. The revival of the weak banks appears 
contingent upon using moderators, which do not pitch for overtly restrictive speed limits. 
There is limited empirical evidence to justify the applicability in real-world economic problems. It 
therefore seems prudent that a thorough analysis of the pros and cons of narrow banking needs to be 
done before one can advocate its implementation in the Indian context. 
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